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  We test the hypothesis that criminal behavior is “contagious” – or susceptible to what 
economists term “endogenous effects” – by examining the extent to which lower local-area 
crime rates decrease arrest rates among individuals. Using data from the Moving to Opportunity 
(MTO) randomized housing-mobility experiment, in operation since 1994 in five U.S. cities, we 
exploit the fact that the effect of treatment group assignment yields different types of 
neighborhood changes across the five demonstration sites and use treatment-site interactions to 
instrument for measures of post-randomization neighborhood crime rates as well as 
neighborhood poverty or racial segregation in analysis of individual arrest outcomes.  We find no 
evidence that violence is contagious; neighborhood racial segregation appears to be the most 
important explanation for across-neighborhood variation in arrests for violent crimes. Our only 
evidence for contagion comes with less serious crimes.  Some estimates suggest an effect for 
males, but these results are imprecise.  We also find evidence that young males are more likely to 
engage in property crimes when violent crimes are relatively more prevalent within the 
community. These findings are consistent with a “resource swamping” model in which increases 
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I. Introduction 
Crime rates vary dramatically across countries, states, cities and, most relevant for the 
present paper, neighborhoods,
1 which represents what Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman 
(1996, p. 507) call “the most puzzling aspect of crime.”  Understanding whether this variation in 
criminal behavior reflects the causal effects of social context or instead simply reflects how high-
risk people are sorted across areas is relevant for government decisions that affect residential 
sorting, as well as for the design of other criminal justice and social policy interventions.  This 
question is also of interest because of the substantial cost that crime imposes on American 
society – on the order of $1 trillion per year by one recent estimate (Anderson, 1999). 
A large theoretical literature has developed within economics, sociology, criminology and 
social psychology to explain how and why social context may affect an individual’s propensity 
to engage in criminal behavior. One possibility is that criminal behavior is “contagious,” or 
susceptible to what economists term “endogenous effects” (Manski, 1993). That is, local 
prevalence of a given type of criminal behavior may change the individual’s propensity to 
engage in that same behavior by affecting the social stigma associated with the act (preferences), 
perceived net returns to the behavior (information), or the actual probability of arrest 
(constraints) (Cook and Goss, 1996; Manski, 2000). An alternative possibility is that the 
individual’s criminal behavior is affected by “contextual effects” -- that is, other attributes of 
neighborhood residents, including socio-demographic characteristics as in role model stories 
(Wilson, 1987) or the willingness of neighbors to become involved in local order maintenance, 
which Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls (1997) term “collective efficacy.” A third possibility is 
“correlated effects” -- that is, the institutional or other characteristics of neighborhoods 
themselves may matter for criminal behavior (Jencks and Mayer, 1990). Determining whether 
any of these models – or selection – explain neighborhood variation in crime is important 
because only with contagion do policy interventions or other exogenous shocks become 
amplified through “social multipliers” (Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 1996, 2003). 
                                                 
1 For example in Wilmette, Illinois, an affluent suburb just north of Chicago with a median home value of $441,000, 
the homicide rate in 2002 equaled 0 per 100,000 residents. In Chicago the homicide rate was equal to 23 per 100,000 
for the city as a whole, and in some high-poverty neighborhoods on the South Side homicide rates are as high as 60 
or 70 per 100,000 (Citywide homicide rates from city-data.com, while district-level homicide rates within Chicago 
come from the Chicago Police Department (2003). Similarly, data from the Chicago Police Department show that 
around 10% of police beats accounted for around 30% of all homicides. 4 
Is crime actually contagious?  Despite the large theoretical literature on this question, the 
available empirical evidence is currently quite limited. Glaeser, Scheinkman and Sacerdote 
(1996) document excess variation in crime rates across areas beyond what can be explained by 
variation in standard socio-demographic determinants of criminal behavior. Their results suggest 
that social interactions are more important for less-serious than more-serious crimes. While a 
number of empirical studies have claimed to produce more direct evidence for social multipliers 
for anti-social behavior, perhaps most famously Crane (1991), in the presence of endogenous 
residential sorting such studies may confound the causal effects of neighborhood environment 
with those of unmeasured individual or family characteristics associated with neighborhood 
selection. Of course even in the absence of the selection problem, such studies will have 
difficulty determining which of the models above are responsible for any observed neighborhood 
effects on criminal behavior. 
In this paper we provide an empirical test of whether crime is contagious (that is, susceptible 
to endogenous effects) by drawing on data from the Moving to Opportunity (MTO) randomized 
housing-mobility experiment. The MTO demonstration, sponsored by the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development (HUD), has been in operation since 1994 in five cities: 
Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York. Eligibility for the program was 
restricted to low-income families with children in these five cities, living within public or 
Section 8 project-based housing in selected high-poverty census tracts.
2  From 1994 to 1997, 
4,248 families were randomly assigned into one of three groups. The “experimental” group was 
offered the opportunity to relocate using a housing voucher that could only be used to lease a 
unit in census tracts with 1990 poverty rates of 10 percent or less.
3  Families assigned to the 
“Section 8” group were offered housing vouchers with no constraints under the MTO program 
design on where the vouchers could be redeemed. Families assigned to the “control” group were 
offered no services under MTO, but did not lose access to social services to which they were 
otherwise entitled such as public housing. Because of random assignment, MTO yields three 
                                                 
2 Section 8 project-based housing might be thought of as essentially privately-operated public housing (Olsen 2003). 
The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development contracts with private providers to develop and manage 
housing projects that include units reserved for low-income families. 
3 Housing vouchers provide families with subsidies to live in private-market housing. The subsidy amount is 
typically defined as the difference between 30 percent of the household’s income and the HUD-defined Fair Market 
Rent, which equals either the 40
th or 45
th percentile of the local area rent distribution. MTO vouchers required 
residence in these tracts for a minimum of one year for renewal of the subsidy. Experimental group families were 
also provided with mobility assistance and in some cases other counseling services as well. 5 
comparable groups of families living in very different kinds of post-program neighborhoods. 
Kling, Ludwig, and Katz (2005; hereafter KLK) found the offer to relocate to lower-poverty 
areas reduces arrests among female youth for violent and property crimes, relative to a control 
group. For males the offer to relocate reduces arrests for violent crime, at least in the short run, 
but increases problem behaviors and property crime arrests. For the present analysis, we re-
examine these data on youth and also incorporate outcome data on the arrests of adults, who in 
the general population are responsible for most of the crimes committed in the U.S. each year. 
We use data from MTO to determine the degree to which variation across neighborhoods in 
criminal behavior is due to the prevalence of crime in the neighborhood, as in contagion models, 
or to some other feature of the neighborhood. Our analysis exploits the fact that random 
assignment to the two MTO treatment groups produced different types of neighborhood changes 
across the five demonstration sites.  We use site-treatment interactions as instrumental variables 
for specific neighborhood attributes, which exploits the fact that differences across sites in the 
effect of treatment assignment on different neighborhood characteristics are not perfectly 
correlated. That is, treatment assignment in some sites has an unusually large effect on census 
tract poverty rates or percent minority while in other sites treatment assignment yields the most 
pronounced changes in neighborhood crime rates. As a result we can use treatment assignment 
interacted with site indicators as instruments for both a measure of neighborhood crime and some 
measure of neighborhood socio-demographic composition, such as economic or racial 
integration. 
Our results are not consistent with the idea that contagion (or equivalently social multipliers 
or endogenous peer effects) provide a good explanation for across-neighborhood variation in 
crime rates. Like Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) we find no evidence of contagion 
for the most serious (violent) crimes.
4  When we use MTO assignment interacted with 
demonstration site as instruments we find no relationship between beat-level violent crime rates 
and the rate at which MTO participants are arrested for violent crime. This finding holds for our 
full sample of MTO youth and adults as well as for sub-groups defined by gender and age, and 
also holds when we simultaneously instrument for either census tract poverty rates or the fraction 
of tract residents who are racial or ethnic minorities. Our results suggest that neighborhood class 
                                                 
4 While Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (2003) find some evidence for a social multiplier even for homicides, 
these findings are at least still consistent with the general pattern of our own and Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman 
(1996), suggesting that such multipliers are smaller in magnitude for more serious compared to less serious crimes. 6 
segregation may play a more important role in understanding variation across communities in 
violent crime than many people have believed. 
We also find no evidence for contagion for less serious (property) offenses for the full MTO 
sample, although for young males our results are consistent with a particular type of contagion 
model, namely a specific version of the “resource swamping” model. In these models, police 
resources within an area are assumed to be fixed, at least in the short term, so that involvement in 
crime by others within the community reduces the average police resources available to 
investigate each crime, which in turn reduces the probability of arrest and so may thereby 
increase the individual’s propensity to engage in crime through standard deterrence arguments. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a very brief review 
of the theoretical literature on neighborhood effects, with an emphasis on the various contagion 
or endogenous-effects models that have been discussed in the literature. Section 3 describes our 
data. Section 4 discusses our empirical approach. Section 5 presents our results. Section 6 
discusses the limitations of our analysis as well as policy implications. 
 
II. Theory 
Jencks and Mayer (1990) discuss three classes of models that predict moving out of high 
poverty neighborhoods should reduce participants’ involvement in crime – epidemic (contagion) 
models, collective socialization models, and institutional models. These three models correspond 
to Manski’s (1993) categories of endogenous effects, contextual effects and correlated effects. 
Contagion models (or endogenous effects) emphasize the tendency of “like to beget like,” 
and focus on the role of social interactions in affecting the returns to crime (see Sah, 1991, 
Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman, 1996, and Cook and Goss, 1996). One way this may occur 
is when the prevalence of some behavior affects an individual’s preferences for engaging in that 
activity, as for example by changing the stigma associated with the behavior.
5  Changes in the 
prevalence of criminal behavior within the community may also change individual perceptions 
about the net returns to crime if people believe others in the community have superior 
information about the costs and benefits of living outside the law, as in “information cascade” 
                                                 
5 For example in the 1980s, when “Madison” was the 539
th most popular girl’s name in the U.S., most parents who 
wished to avoid complicated or awkward introductions at the local playground chose more common names. Of 
course the non-comformists who named their daughters Madison in the 1980s presumably would have been less 
likely to do so if their children had been born instead in 2001, when Madison was the second-most-popular girl’s 
name in the country (Postrel 2002).  7 
models (Cook and Goss, 1996).  A related model that emphasizes the role of information is 
“modeling,” in which behavior by others causes individuals to consider activities that would 
otherwise not have occurred to him or her.
6  A third possibility is that the actual payoffs to crime 
change with its prevalence. For example if police resources within a given community are 
relatively fixed, at least in the short run, an increase in criminal behavior by one’s neighbors 
depress the chance that the marginal criminal will be apprehended because the increase in crime 
reduces the police-hours available per crime (“resource swamping”) (Cook and Goss, 1996, 
Schrag and Scotchmer, 1997). 
Collective socialization arguments (or contextual effects) focus on the influence of local 
adults as role models for the returns to pro-social behaviors such as work (Wilson 1987, Ludwig, 
1999) or as enforcers of pro-social norms. Residents may be less likely to free ride on the efforts 
of their neighbors to maintain social control in communities characterized by shared values and 
high levels of trust – what Sampson, Raudenbush and Earls (1997) term “collective efficacy,” 
which they show is strongly correlated with neighborhood crime rates. 
Institutional models (correlated effects) focus on variation across neighborhoods in the 
quality of local institutions rather than in the characteristics or behavior of neighborhood 
residents. The opportunity costs of criminal activity should be relatively greater in areas with 
better public schools (Lochner and Moretti, 2004) and with access to public transportation. The 
probability of punishment would also be expected to be higher in more affluent communities that 
can afford more or better policing (Levitt, 1997, 2002; Sherman, 2002).
7   
While the three types of models discussed above predict that moving from a high-crime, 
highly disadvantaged community to an area with less crime and poverty should reduce the 
propensity to engage in crime, the reverse effect is in principle also possible. The relative 
deprivation model discussed by Jencks and Mayer (1990) focuses on the psychological reaction 
of people to being surrounded by higher-achieving, more affluent peers. Some MTO adults may 
feel resentful or anxious as a result.
8   Moves from more to less disadvantaged communities 
                                                 
6 For example after a “human barbeque” stunt on MTV’s extreme-stunt show Jackass, newspapers were filled with 
stories of young men who voluntarily had themselves set on fire (and in some cases videotaped) by their friends; see 
for example San Antonio Express-News (2002) and Taylor (2002a, 2002b). 
7 In principle predicting the effect of MTO on local policing is complicated by the fact that some police departments 
use targeted patrol programs that devote extra resources to high-risk areas. 
8 Some evidence to support this possibility comes from Costa and Kahn’s (2001) finding that the decline in social 
capital produced outside of the home in the U.S. may be due to increased community heterogeneity, particularly 
with respect to income, which may be due to the preferences of people to socialize with others who are like them. 8 
could also increase property crime because of the increased value of potential “loot” (Ehrlich, 
1981, 1996; Cook, 1986). More generally the economic model of the “market” for crime 
suggests that MTO families may have a comparative advantage in their new, less disadvantaged 
neighborhood in criminal rather than pro-social behavior as a means of securing resources, 
respect or resolving disputes. 
 
III. Data 
Our analysis focuses on all adults who were part of MTO households at baseline, as well as 
baseline youth who were ages 15 to 25 at the end of 2001 (which is the analytic sample used in 
KLK). Because every applicant was required to fill out a baseline survey when they applied to 
MTO, we have basic socio-demographic information for everyone in our analytic sample, as well 
as baseline information about the household itself such as total income and welfare receipt. Our 
outcome measures come from two sources: administrative arrest records, which are available for 
all MTO adults and capture all arrests through the end of 2001; and follow-up surveys conducted 
in 2002, which are available primarily for a random sample of MTO youth and, by virtue of the 
sampling scheme, most MTO female adults. 
Table 1 presents basic characteristics for male and female adults and youth. Almost all 
program participants are members of racial or ethnic minorities, and most households were 
receiving AFDC at baseline. About three-quarters of households reported that getting away from 
gangs and drugs was one of the two most important reasons for volunteering for MTO, while 
around half report that better schools was one of the top two reasons they signed up for the 
program. These baseline characteristics are balanced across MTO treatment groups, as we would 
expect with random assignment. However for a given MTO treatment group, note that the 
baseline characteristics for male adults in MTO differ somewhat from those of female adults or 
youth because of differences by city and race / ethnic group in the propensity of women to be 
married  or cohabit with an adult male. In principle this could complicate our effort to examine 
the influence of specific neighborhood attributes using treatment-demonstration site interactions, 
although as we show below our results are not sensitive to the uneven distribution of adult males 
across demonstration cities. 
For females assigned to the experimental group, the MTO “take-up” rates (use of the offered 
voucher, or compliance rate) were 48 percent for adults and 46 percent for youth.  For male 9 
adults and youth, the take-up rates were 40 and 42 percent, respectively. Among females in the 
Section 8 group, the MTO relocation rates were 62 and 60 percent for adults and youth.  The 
take-up rates for males were 53 percent for adults and 54 percent for youth. Leasing up through 
MTO is complicated in part because many private-market apartments are not affordable under 
HUD’s voucher payment standards and some landlords may be reluctant to accept vouchers. 
Families also have a limited time (usually no more than half a year) to use their housing 
vouchers from the time that they are issued. And in the case of the experimental group, the 
requirement that families move to low poverty tracts constrains their housing choice set. 
Follow-up surveys conducted during 2002 were completed by one adult per household from 
a total of 4,248 MTO households, as well as with 1,807 youth ages 15-20 from the MTO 
households. The adult surveys gave priority to interviewing the female head of household 
identified at baseline, then to interviewing the wife of the head of household at baseline, then to 
interviewing male household heads. In practice over 98% of completed surveys were with female 
adults. The overall effective response rate for the adult survey was 90%,
9 and was equal to 88% 
for the youth survey. For both adults and youth the survey response rates are quite similar across 
MTO treatment groups. The youth but not adult surveys include questions about risky and 
delinquent behavior, although both surveys capture a variety of other non-market behaviors that 
are relevant for understanding the potential mechanisms through which MTO affects adult crime. 
Our main source of outcome data for the present study comes from administrative arrest 
records obtained from government criminal justice agencies. We attempted to match all MTO 
adults and youth to their official arrest histories using information such as name, race, sex, date 
of birth, and social security number. We successfully obtained arrest data from criminal justice 
agencies in the states of each of the five MTO sites – California, Illinois, Maryland, 
Massachusetts and New York – as well as from 15 other states to which MTO participants had 
moved. Overall, we have complete arrest histories for around 95% of MTO participants. As seen 
in the final row of Table 1, this “administrative data response rate” is quite similar across MTO 
groups. (We exclude from our sample the small share of observations for which we are missing 
arrest data). 
                                                 
9 An initial interviewing phase from January to June of 2002 yielded an 80% response rate. At that point, we drew a 
3-in-10 sub-sample of the remaining cases in order to concentrate our resources on interviewing these hard-to-find 
families, and interviewed 48% of this selected group. We calculate the effective response rate as 80 + (1 - .8)*48 = 
89.6. 10 
The administrative arrest histories include information on the date of all arrests, each 
criminal charge for which the individual was arrested, and in most cases information on the 
disposition of each charge as well. Because these are lifetime arrest histories we are able to 
construct measures of arrest experiences both before and after random assignment, and examine 
how neighborhood effects change with time since randomization. The detailed charge 
information in these records enables us to focus on different types of criminal activity. Of 
particular importance is the distinction between property and other offenses, given that variation 
across communities in the availability of “loot” should be more relevant for the former.
10 
Table 1 also shows that there are no statistically significant differences across MTO groups 
in the fraction of male or female adults or youth who have ever been arrested prior to random 
assignment. These results together with those presented here and elsewhere for other baseline 
characteristics and MTO samples suggest that random assignment was in fact random (Kling et 
al., 2004). Table 1 also shows that the fraction of adults who had ever been arrested prior to 
MTO random assignment is markedly higher for males than females.
11 
A sense for the “criminal careers” of males and females in the MTO control group are shown 
in Figure 1, using a “synthetic cohort” approach that compares arrest rates for people of different 
ages using data for 2000 and 2001.  As with previous research (e.g., Tracy, Wolfgang and Figlio, 
1990), we find that offending rates typically peak during late adolescence, and at any given age 
are higher for men than women. 
 
IV. Empirical Methods 
A key issue in the study of the impact of residential location on individual outcomes is the 
selection problem arising from the likely systematic sorting of individuals among neighborhoods 
on the basis of important (unobserved) determinants of socioeconomic outcomes. To identify the 
causal effect of residential location on an outcome of interest, we must compare people living in 
different locations who would have experienced the same outcome, at least on average, if they 
                                                 
10 We exclude motor vehicle violations from the data in states where such offenses are included in arrest histories. 
11 As an aside, the pre-baseline arrest data also provide some evidence for positive assortative mating, consistent 
with what we would expect in an efficient marriage market (Becker, 1991): Among those women who are living 
with an adult male at baseline, those with a prior criminal record are more than twice as likely as other women to be 
living with a man who has a criminal record. Overall women with prior criminal records are less than half as likely 
as other women to have an adult male in the home at baseline, perhaps because many criminally-involved men are 
taken out of the marriage market by imprisonment or premature mortality. 11 
had lived in the same location. Since people cannot be located in two places at once, this 
comparison necessarily involves a counterfactual that cannot be directly observed.  
We use the random assignment of families to different treatment groups in MTO to examine 
how individual criminal behavior responds to changes in neighborhood crime rates and other 
characteristics. Our analysis builds on the approach of Liebman, Katz and Kling (2004; hereafter 
LKK), who developed a method for examining the effects of neighborhood attributes by 
exploiting variation across MTO sites in the effects of both the experimental and Section 8 
treatments on neighborhood characteristics. With this approach a socio-economic measure of the 
local area (W) such as the Census tract poverty rate is viewed as a summary index for a bundle of 
neighborhood characteristics that are changed as a result of MTO. Interactions between treatment 
group assignments (Z) and site indicators (S) are used as instrumental variables to isolate the 
experimentally-induced variation in W across sites and groups, as in equation (1), where the 
main site effects are subsumed in a set of baseline characteristics (X).
12 All regressions use 
sample weights.
13 The second-stage estimates in equation (2) using Z*S interactions as excluded 
instruments show how the effects on neighborhood characteristics in the MTO sample are related 
to treatment effects on outcomes (Y). 
(1) W = Z*Sπ1 + Xβ1 + ε1 
(2) Y = Wγ2 + Xβ2 + ε2 
Our analysis differs from LKK in two important respects. First, we focus on criminal 
behavior, which for a variety of theoretical reasons may be more “contagious” than the behaviors 
                                                 
12 We control for a set of individual and household characteristics taken from the MTO baseline surveys in order to 
account for residual variation in our arrest outcome measures and so improve the precision of our key parameter 
estimates of interest.  Excluding these baseline measures from our specification has little effect on our point 
estimates, but causes our standard errors to increase slightly.  A full description of our baseline characteristics is 
provided in Kling, Ludwig and Katz (2005), Appendix Table 3. 
13 The weights have three components, described in detail in Orr et al. (2003), Appendix B. For administrative data 
analyses, the first two components are set to one since they are only relevant to surveys. First, survey subsample 
members receive greater weight since, in addition to themselves, they represent individuals whom we did not 
attempt to contact during the subsampling phase.  Second, surveyed youth from large families receive greater weight 
since we randomly sampled two children per household implying that youth from large families are representative of 
a larger fraction of the study population.  Third, all individuals in both survey and administrative data analyses are 
weighted by the inverse of their probability of assignment to their experimental group to account for changes in the 
random assignment ratios over time.  The ratio of individuals randomly assigned to treatment groups was changed 
during the course of the demonstration to minimize the minimum detectable effects after take-up of the vouchers 
turned out to be much higher than had been projected.  This last component of the weights is, therefore, necessary to 
prevent time or cohort effects from confounding the results.  Our weights imply that each random assignment period 
is weighted in proportion to the number of people randomly assigned in that period. 12 
examined by LKK such as employment or mental health.
14  Second, LKK focus on estimating 
the effects of neighborhood poverty rates and testing for nonlinear effects of neighborhood 
socioeconomic composition.
15  We extend this approach to also disentangle the effects of 
neighborhood crime rates as well as class and race composition. That is, we can use the 10 
separate treatment-site interactions to instrument for multiple neighborhood measures 
simultaneously. As noted above, the literature on neighborhood effects suggests that each of 
these measures may have conceptually distinct effects on criminal behavior. The key empirical 
prediction from contagion models is that neighborhood crime rates should be positively related 
to individual criminal offending, even after conditioning on neighborhood poverty or race 
composition. 
Note that because MTO engenders change in many neighborhood characteristics 
simultaneously, these instrumental variables estimates cannot be interpreted literally as the 
effects of changing a given neighborhood characteristic on youth behavior. We expect 
neighborhood crime rates to capture any contagion mechanisms that may operate on individual 
criminal behavior plus whatever other neighborhood attributes influence crime and are correlated 
with neighborhood crime rates. Our ability to simultaneously condition on neighborhood poverty 
or racial composition should help account for other criminogenic neighborhood attributes, 
particularly since, as we demonstrate below, neighborhood poverty rates appear to be highly 
correlated with a number of institutional and social factors that existing theories predict should 
influence criminal behavior. 
 
V. Results 
The logic of our analysis is as follows. First, we demonstrate that there were overall program 
effects of MTO voucher offers on both individual arrest outcomes and neighborhood (Census 
tract or police beat) variables that might lead to those outcomes. Second, we show that there are 
some neighborhood variables with effects on the outcomes when the effects of neighborhood 
variables are identified by site-by-treatment group interactions as excluded instruments, 
                                                 
14 Some support for this possibility comes from the recent review of Sampson, Morenoff and Gannon-Rowley 
(2002), which argues that to date the strongest (non-experimental) evidence of neighborhood effects is for criminal 
behavior. 
15 LKK examine poverty rates as well as fraction college graduates, median income and share of households headed 
by a female. To explore non-linear effects, LKK use these site-by-treatment interactions to instrument for higher-
order terms in poverty rates. 13 
consistent with an increasing dose-response relationship of the neighborhood variable on the 
outcome in the MTO experiment. Third, we find that these effects hold for some neighborhood 
demographic variables after conditioning on a neighborhood measure of criminal behavior, such 
as in analysis of violent crime arrests when using tract percentage minority and neighborhood 
violent crime rates as endogenous right hand side variables and ten site-by-treatment indicators 
as instruments. Fourth, we show that the site-by-treatment group effects of beat violent crime on 
individual violent crime arrests and beat property crime on individual property crime arrests are 
negative for females and positive, relatively small in magnitude, and statistically insignificant for 
males. Fifth, for females we find this lack of a strong positive effect holds after conditioning on 
neighborhood demographics. 
To summarize our findings for the full sample (pooling female and males together), if there 
had been a large endogenous social effect of neighborhood crime on individual arrests for 
crimes, we would have expected to have found large coefficients on beat crime variables.
16 The 
beat crime variables, however, were not positive on their own or after conditioning on 
neighborhood demographic characteristics when using site-by-treatment interactions as excluded 
instruments -- suggesting that an endogenous/contagion effect is not simply being offset by a 
third factor.  We believe the lack of association between neighborhood crime and individual 
arrests is quite informative. Although not conclusive, we interpret the pattern of results as 
generally indicating that there are aspects of residential neighborhoods that affect crime, 
particularly neighborhood racial segregation, but that neighborhood crime itself is not a key 
aspect.  That is, we little evidence that crime is contagious for our full sample.  The remainder of 
this section describes our five main findings in detail. 
MTO Effects on Neighborhood Environments and Arrests.  Eligibility for the MTO program 
was limited to families in public housing or Section 8 project-based housing located in some of 
the most disadvantaged census tracts in the five MTO cities and, for that matter, in the country as 
a whole. As shown in Table 2, the mean of duration-weighted averages of poverty rates since 
random assignment for the control group were greater than 40 percent for each gender and age 
group. Despite the fact that a large share of families in both the experimental and Section 8 
groups do not move through MTO, Table 2 shows that assignment to either of these treatment 
                                                 
16 Of course, such a finding would not have proved the existence of an endogenous social effect, since the beat crime 
variable could also have been serving as a proxy for an omitted contextual variable. 14 
groups still produced significant changes in the average Census tract characteristics, where the 
addresses of MTO participants were obtained over time through a variety of active and passive 
tracking methods (Goering et al 1999). MTO had more pronounced effects on economic than 
racial residential integration. In principle neighborhood mobility under MTO could differ by 
gender and age if household composition affects mobility outcomes, but Table 2 shows that in 
general neighborhood characteristics within MTO treatment groups do not appear to vary much 
by gender or age. 
Table 2 also shows average crime rates for the police beats in which MTO families resided 
since random assignment. These findings come from local-area crime and population data for the 
years 1994 through 2001, using the FBI Part I Index offenses for which consistent data are 
available across areas.
17 The crime types used to construct our neighborhood violent and 
property crime rates are the same as those used to define the violent and property arrest outcome 
measures for MTO participants.
18  All MTO addresses located within the five original 
demonstration cities were geo-coded and assigned the crime rate of the police “beat” in which 
that address was located.
19  The resolution provided by this beat-level data varies across cities: 
Baltimore has 9 police beats, while Boston has 11, Chicago 279, Los Angeles 18, and New York 
City 76.
20 As demonstrated in Table 2, the available resolution is sufficient to pick up the large 
effects of MTO voucher offers on crime rates measured at the beat level.  Random assignment to 
                                                 
17 These crime figures come from the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting system, which is subject to a number of well-
known problems such as non-reporting or incomplete reporting. Our results for MTO’s impact on local-area crime 
rates do not appear to be sensitive to how we handle these reporting problems. Our default procedure is to impute 
missing data using the FBI’s standard procedure, which is subject to a number of problems (Maltz 1999). We 
replicate the analysis using only crime data for jurisdictions that report complete data and obtain similar results. 
18 The violent crime rate includes murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.  The property crime rate includes 
burglary, motor vehicle theft, and larceny.  The only distinctions between the neighborhood crime rate measures and 
the individual arrest outcomes for MTO participants is that our arrest data do not allow us to distinguish between 
aggravated and simple assaults, and so we count arrests for all assaults as violent-crime arrests, and also do not 
allow us to distinguish between grand and petite larceny  
19  Some cities call the operational divisions of their cities “districts” or “areas” instead of “beats,” although for 
convenience in what we follows we refer to all of these geographic areas as beats. 
20  Addresses that could not be geo-coded are assigned the city’s overall crime rate. Addresses located outside of the 
five original MTO cities are assigned either place- or county-level crime data, depending on whether the 
municipality in which the address is located is patrolled by a local or a county law enforcement agency. For 
Baltimore we are missing beat-level offense data for 1994 and 1995, so we estimate these beat-level offense counts 
assuming that the annual percentage change observed between 1996 and 1997 is similar to what Baltimore 
experienced in 1994-6. We use a similar procedure to estimate beat-level 2002 data for Chicago and New York. In 
the end, we have local-area criminal justice data for nearly 47,000 of the 48,751 MTO address spells for the years 
1997-2001. These figures run a bit lower for 1994-6 because of missing crime data for two of Boston’s police 
districts in those years. Fully 77% of addresses are matched to beat-level data and 10% to city-level data in the 5 
MTO cities; an additional 7% of addresses are matched to place-level data outside of these cities, and around 2% are 
matched to county-level data outside the MTO cities. 15 
the experimental or Section 8 group resulted in substantial reductions in beat violent crime rates 
relative to the control group.  The effects of voucher offers on property crime rates were 
approximately the same absolute magnitude (over 30 crimes per 10,000 residents), but smaller 
relative to the larger base rate of property crimes than violent crimes in the control group beats 
and with larger p-values on the between group differences.
21 
The average number of arrests since random assignment -- for total (including non-violent 
non-property) arrests, arrests for violent crimes, and arrests for property crimes -- is also shown 
in Table 2. Notable differences between groups are in the reduction in violent crime arrests 
among female youth for the Section 8 group relative to controls, and the increase in property 
crime arrests among male youth in the experimental group relative to controls.
22 
Effects of Neighborhoods on Arrests of Individuals. Given that there were some program 
effects -- large effects of the voucher offers on local-area (tract and beat) characteristics and also 
effects on individual arrest outcomes for some groups -- we next examine the extent to which the 
pattern of effects across the MTO sites and treatment groups showed an association of effects on 
a local-area variable with effects on arrest outcomes of MTO individuals, using the instrumental 
variables method outlined in section IV. In a model where the only baseline covariates are site 
indicators, two stage least squares estimation of equation (2) with one endogenous variable 
reduces the data to fifteen group means (three randomly assigned groups at each of the five sites) 
normalized so that the overall mean for each site is zero, and then calculates the slope of the 
relationship between the normalized site-by-group means of the outcome and the normalized 
site-by-group means of the endogenous variable.
23  Although we use a larger set of covariates 
than just site indicators, they are approximately orthogonal to the treatment indicators 
conditional on site, and the same essential intuition holds.  Assuming no other confounders, this 
method assesses the dose-response relationship, and estimates how the magnitude of the dose 
(such as the effect on beat violent crime rates of the experimental or Section 8 voucher at a 
particular site) is associated with the response (such as the effect on the total number of violent 
crime arrests for MTO individuals in the experimental or Section 8 voucher groups at that site). 
                                                 
21 The differences between the both voucher groups and the control group had p-values less than five percent for 
female youth and adults, but not for males. 
22 Simple differences in means are the basis of the statistical tests reported in Table 2.  Regression-adjustment of the 
intent-to-treat effects using baseline covariates increases the precision of these results, as reported in KLK.   
23 For a graphical representation of fifteen group means and associated slope relating tract poverty rates to female 
youth outcomes in MTO, see Liebman, Katz, and Kling (2004). 16 
The results for tract percentage minority are given in panel A of Table 3.  The first row 
shows results of estimation of equation (2) in which right-hand side endogenous variable (W) is 
tract percentage minority, and each column shows the estimates for the minority variable from a 
separate 2SLS estimation on the sample for that column. All endogenous variables in Table 3 are 
scaled in standard deviation units to facilitate comparison across panels, with the standard 
deviation values themselves given in the notes to the table. The first column pools all 
observations, including both genders and all age ranges.  The coefficient shows that a one 
standard deviation unit decrease in tract percentage minority, which is equivalent to a change 
from 90 percent minority to 73 percent minority, is associated with a decrease of .067 violent 
crime arrests per person since random assignment -- which is a relative change of 33% from a 
benchmark such as the control mean.  This effect is of large substantive magnitude and is 
statistically significant for the full sample and for subsamples of female youth and adults as 
shown in the second and fourth columns, although not for male youth. The results are of similar 
magnitude for males.  
The finding that neighborhood racial composition has a strong relationship with violent crime 
arrests is robust to conditioning on changes in neighborhood poverty, violent-crime rates, or 
property-crime rates, also shown in panel A.  Although we have ten excluded instruments, the 
neighborhood variables are somewhat collinear and accounting for two right hand side 
endogenous variables rather than one increases our standard errors by 15, 39, and 55 percent 
after conditioning on poverty, violent-crime, or property-crime respectively. We use no more 
than two endogenous variables in any of our instrumental variable estimations in order to avoid 
severe multicollinearity. 
In contrast to the strong association with neighborhood racial composition, individual arrest 
outcomes do not have a consistent pattern of association with neighborhood poverty rates.  Panel 
B of Table 3 shows large and significant effects only for female youth.  Moreover, the coefficient 
falls dramatically when racial composition is also included as a second endogenous variable, 
indicating that racial composition is more potent explanatory factor. 
Although there is evidence in panel A that some neighborhood conditions such as percentage 
minority are positively associated with individual arrest outcomes for violent crimes, we find no 
evidence for contagion in violent arrests among MTO participants, as shown in panel C of Table 
3. Contagion models predict a positive relationship between neighborhood violent crime rates 17 
and the propensity of MTO participants to engage in violent crime. For the full sample, in the 
first row and first column of panel C, the results indicate that participants in sites where 
treatment assignment leads to relatively greater declines in beat-level violent crime rates do not 
experience relatively greater declines in their own violent-crime arrest rates. Our point estimate 
for the effect of local-area violent crime rates on violent arrests for the full MTO sample is small 
both absolutely and in relation to the standard error. Nor are the point estimates close to 
statistical significance for any of the sub-groups that we examine.   
We find little evidence that violent crime is contagious for MTO families even after 
conditioning on census tract poverty rates or racial composition, with results shown in the 
remaining rows of panel C. One concern with the results presented in the first row of panel C is 
that MTO moves induce changes in other neighborhood attributes as well, which could confound 
our effort to isolate the effects of contagion on violent criminal behavior. For example, Table 2 
showed that MTO led families to move to neighborhoods with fewer poor or minority families as 
well as lower crime rates. If program participants increase their involvement with violent crime 
in response to social isolation (being around fewer economically or demographically similar 
residents) then the results using a single endogenous variable would confound these negative 
reactions to MTO moves with any decline in violent crime that arises from now living in a 
neighborhood where violent crime is less prevalent. If anything, the results run counter to this 
hypothesis, as the point estimates for the effect of beat violent crime conditional on tract 
percentage minority are actually negative in sign (and statistically significant for females) as 
opposed to the positive prediction. Overall, the results for beat level violent crime show no 
evidence of substantial positive coefficients that would have been consistent with an important 
influence of contagion for violent-crime arrests. 
To the extent that neighborhood demographic factors are associated with individual property 
crime arrests, the signs of the estimates in panels A and B of Table 4 indicate that a lower 
percentage minority or poverty is associated with more arrests -- which are consistent with the 
increase in property crime arrests for male youth seen in Table 2.  We do find some evidence of a 
positive relationship between neighborhood violent crime rates (conditioning on tract percentage 
minority or poverty) and the rate at which young males are arrested for property crimes, as 
shown in panel C. Similarly, we find that male youth, in neighborhoods where violent and 
property crimes are relatively more common, are more likely to be arrested for drug offenses or 18 
other (non-violent, non-property, non-drug) offenses in results shown in the appendix.
24  Lower 
neighborhood property crime rates did lead to fewer individual property-crime arrests for males, 
with point estimates that are of large magnitude but that are imprecisely estimated as shown in 
panel D. The results in panel D provide little evidence for contagion in property-crime arrests for 
females or for the pooled sample as a whole.
25 
One potential concern with these results is that we may be confounding the effect of 
neighborhood characteristics on the probability of arrest (P) with neighborhood effects on actual 
criminal behavior (C), since we are relying on a measure of arrests (A) and the three factors have 
a mechanical relationship A=P×C. If the probability of arrest is higher in low-crime, low-poverty 
neighborhoods, then our estimates would understate the effects of moving to a less distressed 
neighborhood on criminal behavior – that is, we might be understating any contagious processes 
at work among the MTO population. Some support for this concern comes from evidence that 
MTO household heads assigned to the experimental or Section 8 groups are less likely than 
controls to report that their neighborhoods have a problem with police not coming in response to 
911 calls for service (Kling, Ludwig and Katz, 2005). This police-responsiveness measure is 
presumably positively correlated to some degree with the probability that a crime results in 
arrest. 
The first row of Table 5, however, shows that our neighborhood poverty rate measure is 
much more strongly correlated with the survey-reported measure of police responsiveness than 
are any of our other neighborhood measures. Even after conditioning on neighborhood violent 
crime or percent minority, tract poverty rates have a statistically significant positive relationship 
with our proxy for policing quality while these other neighborhood characteristics do not. If our 
empirical test of contagion is confounded by policing intensity bias, we would expect the 
magnitude of our IV estimate for neighborhood violent- or property-crime rates on the violent or 
                                                 
24 About half of the effect of beat-level crime rates on drug arrests is due to impacts on MTO young male drug 
dealing arrests, the other half for drug possession arrests for this group; the arrestee may or may not have been 
dealing with these possession arrests, since the distinction between the two charges is often a matter of the quantity 
of drugs in the individual’s possession.  We urge some caution in drawing inferences for drug and other arrests, 
however, since most of these are – unlike violent and property crimes – victimless (at least there is no immediate 
identifiable victim), and so arrest rates for such offenses across neighborhoods may be particularly susceptible to 
variation in law enforcement practices rather than the prevalence of actual criminal behavior. 
25 The results for the full sample do not fall within the range of estimates of the four subgroups shown in Table 4. 
This is driven by the inclusion of the adult male sample, which as shown in Table 1 has a much larger fraction of the 
sample in Boston and LA -- apparently because female adults in these sites are more likely to be married or cohabit 
than are women in the other sites.  Pooled results for female adults, female youth, and male youth are close to a 
simple sample-size-weighted average of the subgroup estimates. 19 
property crime arrest rates among MTO participants to increase (move to the right on the real 
number line, that is, show more evidence of contagion) when we condition on neighborhood 
poverty rates, which seems to be highly correlated with our measure of policing quality. Yet this 
does not appear to be the case for our full MTO sample or any sub-groups for violent crime 
(Table 4), or for any sample or sub-group for property crime excepting perhaps young males 
(Table 5). More generally neighborhood poverty rates also appear to be strongly correlated with 
most of the other institutional or social processes that theories of contextual or correlated effects 
predict should influence individual criminal behavior. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
Our results taken as a whole are not very consistent with the idea that contagion (or 
equivalently social multipliers or endogenous peer effects) provide a good explanation for 
across-neighborhood variation in crime rates. We find no evidence for contagion for violent 
crime. For property crimes we do not find strong evidence that “like begets like” (neighborhood 
property crimes affect property offending); for males our results are too imprecise to constitute 
strong evidence, although the point estimates are consistent with some contagion. Our results 
taken together suggest that the role of neighborhood racial segregation may play a more 
important role in understanding variation across neighborhoods in violent crime than is currently 
thought. 
We do find some evidence that is consistent with one specific contagion model – “resource 
swamping” – or at least a modified version of this model that may apply to at least young males. 
While violent crime by male youth is not responsive to the local violent crime rate, we do find 
that male youth are more likely to engage in property crime when local violent crime rates are 
higher.
26 The general pattern seems to be that in areas where more serious crimes are more 
common, young men may take advantage of the police emphasis on addressing more severe 
offenses by increasing their involvement with less serious types of criminal offenses. These 
results are consistent with previous findings that police resources affect criminal behavior 
(Levitt, 1997, 2002, Sherman, 2002, Cohen and Ludwig, 2003) and that juveniles are responsive 
just as are adults to the threat of punishment (Levitt, 1998). Under this interpretation, one 
                                                 
26 In results given in the appendix, male youth are more likely to be arrested for drug or other (non-drug, non-
property, non-violent) crimes in areas where violent or property crime rates are relatively higher 20 
implication is that spillovers may occur across crime categories, where changes in rates of more 
serious crimes affect the prevalence of less serious offenses. Spillovers from increases in serious 
crimes could in principle be mitigated through commensurate increases in local police resources, 
without necessarily having to directly address other aspects of social interactions. Our findings 
are in some sense the reverse of the “broken windows” hypothesis offered by James Q. Wilson 
and George Kelling (1982), in which they argued that changes in less serious offenses change 
perceptions if disorder and law enforcement within a neighborhood and thereby affect the 
prevalence of more serious crime.
27 
Perhaps the most important concern with our findings is that with only 10 treatment-site 
interactions, we are limited in the number of neighborhood measures that can be instrumented 
for at once. However it is important to note that no previous study in the neighborhood effects 
literature has had a source of truly credible identifying information for a single measure of 
neighborhood environment, much less been able to instrument for multiple neighborhood 
attributes simultaneously. MTO’s random-assignment experimental design provides us with one 
of the first opportunities to explore the relationship between different specific neighborhood 
measures and criminal behavior without the self-selection concern that plagues most previous 
studies on this topic. 
We interpret the specific neighborhood measures in our study as proxies for the bundle of 
neighborhood attributes that may affect individual behavior. The instrumental variables analysis 
in Table 5 relating local-area characteristics to self-reports of neighborhood environment shows 
that tract poverty seems to be the best proxy for the constellation of neighborhood attributes that 
contextual effect and correlated effect theories predict should affect behavior, including 
measures of policing quality, neighborhood disorder, “collective efficacy,” and access to 
employment opportunities. Yet conditional on tract poverty (or tract percent minority, for that 
matter), we find no evidence for “contagion” for violent crime – that is, we do not find a positive 
relationship between beat-level crime and the rate at which MTO participants are arrested for 
violent crime. For contagion to be at work for violent crime, our beat-level crime rates would 
need to be negatively correlated with other neighborhood-level “criminogenic” factors (those that 
increase people’s predisposition to commit crime), which is rather counter-intuitive – 
                                                 
27 While Kelling and Sousa (2001) and Corman and Mocan (2002) present evidence from New York City data that 
they claim provide empirical support for broken windows, Harcourt and Ludwig (2005) re-analyze these data and 
find little support for the hypothesis. 21 
criminogenic factors would need to be more scarce in higher-crime communities. And even here, 
bias could only come from unmeasured neighborhood attributes that are both criminogenic and 
uncorrelated with tract poverty or percent minority, since our results are robust to instrumenting 
for these measures in the same specification. 
A final question with our estimates has to do with generalizability, since MTO participants 
represent a self-selected set of public housing residents who volunteered to join the program. We 
might expect that the eligible public housing families who signed up for MTO would be those 
who expected to benefit the most from moving. Far and away the most important reason MTO 
that families signed up for the program is to escape from gangs and drugs. There are in short 
reasons to believe that if anything people participating in the MTO demonstration may be above-
average in their behavioral sensitivity to changes in neighborhood environment.  
In sum, our findings on the whole do not support the idea that contagion explains the 
variation across neighborhoods in violent-crime rates, nor with the idea that contagion is of first-
order importance in explaining variation in less-serious crimes at least for females (as our results 
about property crime contagion for males are inconclusive). The finding that contagion might be 
somewhat more important for less-serious than more-serious crimes – that is, a “contagion 
gradient” – is consistent with the results reported by Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996, 
2003). To the extent to which other studies have claimed that contagion is in fact the main source 
of variation across neighborhoods in violent crimes the results would seem to be due instead to 
some combination of endogenous sorting (self selection) and unmeasured aspects of 
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Notes.  Figure 1 presents 3-year moving averages of arrest rates by age, pooling data from 2000 and 2001. Arrest 
rates below the age of majority may be underestimated due to superior coverage for juvenile arrest records among 
those MTO participants who were youth at baseline rather than adults. 25 
Table 1 
Baseline Descriptive Statistics for MTO Adult and Youth Samples 
    Females      Males  
  Experimental Section  8  Control   Experimental Section  8  Control 

























































HH on AFDC at 
baseline 
.739 .752  .756    .579  .586  .491 
Moved because:  
  Drugs, crime 



















Age at end of 2001  39.0  39.4  39.1    43.0  43.4  44.8 










Missing admin arrest 
data 
.038 .054  .035    .056  .048  .057 
N 1,483  1,013  1,102    224  153  166 

























































HH on AFDC at 
baseline 
.732 .744  .749    .743  .706  .727 
Moved because:  
  Drugs, crime 



















Age at end of 2001  19.1  18.9  18.9    19.0  18.9  19.0 
Any pre-RA arrest 
  
.062 .041  .048    .147  .122  .131 
Missing admin arrest 
data 
.057 .048  .055    .059  .063  .061 
N 966  651  716    988  691  739 
 
Notes: * = p-value <.05 on Experimental-Control or Section 8-Control difference. 26 
Table 2 
Mobility Outcomes by MTO group, Age Group and Gender 
    Females      Males  
  Experimental Section  8  Control    Experimental Section  8  Control 
ADULTS             
Tract poverty rate 
  0-20% 
  20-40% 

























Percent tract black  .532*  .537* .566    .389  .454  .402 
Percent tract minority  .816* .868*  .890    .833*  .887  .883 
Beat violent crime rate  224.3*  228.3*  264.0    171.9  185.0  194.4 
Beat property crime rate  520.2* 522.9*  561.2    403.7  465.6  440.6 
Arrests since RA: 
  Violent 
  Property 



























YOUTH             
Tract poverty rate 
  0-20% 
  20-40% 

























Percent tract black  .536  .527 .555    .524  .531  .542 
Percent tract minority  .831* .880  .899    .831*  .875*  .903 
Beat violent crime rate  223.2*  228.2*  260.1    225.4*  231.0*  260.3 
Beat property crime rate  531.9 518.2  574.9    535.4 540.6  547.0 
Arrests since RA: 
  Violent 
  Property 


























Notes: Tract data are based on duration-weighted averages of tract characteristics, interpolating between and 
extrapolating from 1990 and 2000 Censuses. Police beat rates are crimes per 10,000 residents in the beat.  * = p-
value <.05 on Exp-Control or S8-Control difference.27 
 
Table 3 
IV Estimates for Violent-Crime Arrests Since Random Assignment 
 
Full sample  Female Youth  Male Youth  Female Adults  Male adults 
A. Tract percentage minority           











               











          











          











          
B. Tract percentage in poverty           











               











          











          











          
C. Beat violent crime rate           











               











          











          
D. Beat property crime rate           











               











          











          
 
Notes: Each cell in the table contains the coefficient [with standard errors] from a separate 2SLS estimate of 
equation (2), with each row label describing the one or two components of W in (2).  E.g., in the first row W only 
contains traction fraction minority; in the second row, W contains tract percentage minority and tract percentage in 
poverty, and the coefficient reported is for minority. Samples vary by column. Endogenous variables are all 
expressed in standard deviation units relative to the standard deviation in the control group for that variable. The 
control group standard deviations are: 17% for tract minority, 14% for tract poverty, 185 for beat violent crime, and 
525 for beat property crime. 28 
 
Table 4 
IV Estimates for Property Crime Arrests Since Random Assignment 
  Full sample  Female Youth  Male Youth  Female Adults  Male adults 
Endogenous variables in s.d. units         











               











          











          











          
B. Tract percentage in poverty           











               











          











          











          
C. Beat violent crime rate           











               











          











          
D. Beat property crime rate           











               











          











          
 
Notes: Each cell in the table contains the coefficient [with standard errors] from a separate 2SLS estimate of 
equation (2), with each row label describing the one or two components of W in (2).  E.g., in the first row W only 
contains traction fraction minority; in the second row, W contains tract percentage minority and tract percentage in 
poverty, and the coefficient reported is for minority. Samples vary by column. Endogenous variables are all 
expressed in standard deviation units relative to the standard deviation in the control group for that variable and 
sample. The control group standard deviations are: 17% for tract minority, 14% for tract poverty, 185 for beat 
violent crime, and 525 for beat property crime. 29 
Table 5 
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Violent crime  
| Poverty 
Violent crime  
| Minority 
Violent crime  
| Property crime 
Property crime 
| Violent crime 
               
Problem w/ police not 







































































Treated unfairly by 

















Treated unfairly at 
school / work 


















Notes: Each cell in the table contains the coefficient [with standard errors] from a separate 2SLS estimate of 
equation (2).  Left-hand side variables are described by the row labels, and were taken from household head survey 
responses in 2002. Each column label describes the two components of W used in estimation of (2).  E.g., in the first 
column W includes tract percentage minority and tract percentage in poverty, and the coefficient reported is for 
poverty.  Sample is all adults surveyed, who were 98% female. Endogenous variables are all expressed in standard 
deviation units relative to the standard deviation in the control group. The control group standard deviations are: 
14.4 for tract percentage in poverty, 17.3 for tract percentage minority, 183 for beat violent crime rate per 10,000 
population, and 72 for beat property crime rate per 10,000 population. * = p-value < .05 30 
 
Appendix Table A 
IV Estimates for Other Crime Arrests Since Random Assignment 
  Full sample  Female Youth  Male Youth  Female Adults  Male adults 
Endogenous variables in s.d. units         











               











          











          











          
B. Tract percentage in poverty           











               











          











          











          
C. Beat violent crime rate           











               











          











          
D. Beat property crime rate           











               











          











          
 
Notes: Each cell in the table contains the coefficient [with standard errors] from a separate 2SLS estimate of 
equation (2), with each row label describing the one or two components of W in (2).  E.g., in the first row W only 
contains traction fraction minority; in the second row, W contains tract percentage minority and tract percentage in 
poverty, and the coefficient reported is for minority. Samples vary by column. Endogenous variables are all 
expressed in standard deviation units relative to the standard deviation in the control group for that variable and 
sample. The control group standard deviations are: 17% for tract minority, 14% for tract poverty, 185 for beat 
violent crime, and 525 for beat property crime. 